

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 ERDA-05 AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00  
EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15  
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R 161720Z MAR 77  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2230  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
CINCLANT  
USCINCEUR  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
USLOSACLANT  
USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1496

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG  
SUBJECT: THE CRUISE MISSILE: A NATO ISSUE

REF: (A) USNATO 1391 (DTG 111656Z MAR 77-NOTAL), (B) USNATO  
1419 (DTG 130200Z MAR 77-NOTAL), (C) LONDON 03744 (DTG  
041858Z MAR 77-NOTAL), (D) BONN 4427 (DTG 111628Z MAR 77-  
NOTAL), (E) STATE 057067 (DTG 150207Z MAR 77-NOTAL)

SUMMARY: BECAUSE THE CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE AT THE FOREFRONT  
OF ALLIED CONCERNS THIS SPRING IN NATO DISCUSSIONS OF ARMS  
CONTROL AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE ISSUES, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD  
ENGAGE THE ALLIES MORE DEEPLY IN THIS SUBJECT TO (A) BUILD  
ALLIED SUPPORT FOR PROSPECTIVE SALT AGREEMENTS, AND (B) CREATE  
A BALANCED PERSPECTIVE ON THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF CRUISE  
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MISSILES TO NATO DEFENSE. CRUISE MISSILES IN ANY CASE  
WILL BE A PROMINENT SUBJECT OF INTEREST IN NPG NUCLEAR  
BALANCE DISCUSSIONS THIS SPRING, PROBABLY BEGINNING  
AT PERMREP LEVEL IN APRIL. WE MUST, THEREFORE,  
CAREFULLY COORDINATE OUR APPROACHES IN NATO FORA.  
END SUMMARY.

THE PROBLEM.

1. THE ALLIES CLEARLY WILL GIVE CAREFULL ATTENTION TO

CRUISE MISSILES IN THE MONTHS AHEAD -- IN SALT  
CONSULTATIONS (REFS A AND B), BILATERALLY (REFS C AND D),  
AND IN NPG DISCUSSIONS THIS SPRING ON THE NUCLEAR  
BALANCE. THERE ARE NOW, HOWEVER, A COMBINATION OF  
FACTORS PRESSING THE SUBJECT FURTHER TO THE FOREFRONT:  
--THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS INDICATED POSSIBLE  
NEW APPROACHES TO CRUISE MISSILES IN SALT;  
--US DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE PROGRESSING  
SMARTLY, TO INCLUDE CONTRACTION ON DEVELOPING A  
GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM);  
--THE ALLIES PERCEIVE DISTURBING TRENDS IN THE  
SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR THREAT, SUCH AS THE SS-20,  
WHICH ARE FOCUSING THEIR THOUGHTS ON NUCLEAR  
DETERRENCE IN EUROPE.

2. THE CRUISE MISSILE'S POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE US  
STRATEGIC ARSENAL WOULD SUFFICE TO SPARK ALLIED ATTENTION.  
BUT THE FACT THAT CRUISE MISSILES COULD FIT SIGNIFICANTLY  
INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE, COUPLED WITH  
THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR  
DEVELOPMENT, MAKES THEM A PRIME TOPIC ON WHICH THE  
ALLIES WILL LIKELY MEASURE OUR CONSULTATION  
CREDENTIALS.

3. THE SUBJECT, OF COURSE, IS NOT NEW IN NATO. WE  
HAVE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO CRUISE MISSILE  
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LIMITATIONS IN PAST SALT CONSULTATIONS. QUESTIONS  
ON THE MISSILES WERE RAISED IN SEVERAL PAST NPG  
MINISTERIALS, AND WE PRESENTED A SUBSTANTIAL BRIEFING  
ON CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NPG LAST NOVEMBER.

THE POSITION OF THE ALLIES.

4. THE PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIES NOW IS THAT THEY SEEM  
TO HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT CRUISE MISSILE COULD DO  
FOR THEIR SECURITY OR OF THE PRICE IN CRUISE MISSILE  
RESTRICTIONS THAT MIGHT BE WORTH PAYING TO ACHIEVE A  
SALT AGREEMENT. INDEED, THEIR MAIN FEAR MAY BE THAT  
THE US WILL STAMPEDE THEM INTO CONSULTATIONS ON AN  
EMERGING SALT AGREEMENT BEFORE THEY UNDERSTAND CLEARLY  
THE TRADE-OFFS.

5. IN SALT I, WHEN THE NUCLEAR THREAT FACING EUROPE  
WAS RELATIVELY STATIC, THE ALLIES COULD EMBRACE THE  
AGREED LIMITATIONS ON CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THE  
EXCLUSION OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. THE ALLIES, AWARE OF AN  
IMPENDING SALT II AGREEMENT AND A CHANGING THEATER  
NUCLEAR THREAT, SEE THEIR VITAL INTERESTS  
AS MORE DIRECTLY AFFECTED, AND WILL SCRUTINIZE ANY  
EMERGING US-SOVIET AGREEMENT WITH GREAT CARE.

6. IN THIS REGARD, WE EXPECT SOME ALLIES SPECIFICALLY TO RELATE THE SS-20 AND CRUISE MISSILES. WHILE THE LATTER ARE, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE A DIRECT MILITARY "COUNTER" TO THE SS-20, THEY REPRESENT IN THE EYES OF SOME ALLIED STRATEGISTS A POTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION TO DETERRENCE WHICH THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO SEE SACRIFICED WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF RECIPROCAL SOVIET RESTRAINT. FURTHER, WE NOTE (REF A) CONTINUING EUROPEAN INTEREST, EVEN IF ILL-DEFINED, IN CRUISE MISSILE POTENTIAL FOR A FUTURE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

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7. REGARDING A POSSIBLE SALT AGREEMENT EXCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES, THE ALLIES WILL WANT TO KNOW THE RATIONALE FOR DEFERRING CRUISE MISSILES TO SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO HAVE A US VIEW ON THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF CRUISE MISSILES IN FUTURE US-ALLIED MILITARY STRATEGY.

BRIEFINGS FOR NATO.

8. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BRING THE ALLIES CAREFULLY UP TO SPEED THIS SPRING ON CRUISE MISSILES, IN ORDER TO BUILD ALLIED SUPPORT FOR

US APPROACHES.

(A) BRIEFING CONTENT. THE ALLIES WELCOMED THE  
TECHNICAL PRESENTATIONS AT THE NOVEMBER NPG, BUT WE  
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EXPECT CURRENT INTEREST WILL FOCUS ON:

--THE MILITARY,STRATEGIC AND POTENTIAL  
IMPLICATIONS OF CRUISE MISSILES;  
--THE US THINKING ON THE ROLE FOR A GLCM  
(OF PARTICULAR UK AND FRG CONCERN).  
UNDER THIS RUBRIC, THE ALLIES WILL BE PARTICULARLY  
INTERESTED IN SUB-ASPECTS SUCH AS MOBILITY, RANGES, TARGETS,  
CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS, SURVIVABILITY  
BEFORE LAUNCH AND VULNERABILITY IN FLIGHT, COSTS,  
AND POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS.

(B) FORMAT FOR DISCUSSION. WE ASSUME THE US WILL  
REVIEW THE STATUS OF CRUISE MISSILES IN FORTHCOMING  
SALT CONSULTATIONS IN THE NAC (REF E). WE ALSO EXPECT  
THE ALLIES WILL RAISE THE SUBJECT THIS SPRING IN THE  
NPG DISCUSSIONS ON THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. SPECIFICALLY,  
SYG LUNS PLANS TO PROPOSE AN NPG PERMREPS MEETING ON  
THE NUCLEAR BALANCE DURING THE SECOND HALF OF APRIL TO  
FORESHADOW SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS BY NPG MINISTERS IN JUNE.  
WHILE THE PRMIARY US PURPOSE AT THE APRIL  
MEETING SHOULD BE TO HEAR OUT THE ALLIES, WE BELIEVE THE  
US ALSO SHOULD BE PREPARED:  
--TO DISCUSS ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS  
INCLUDING THE RATIONALE FOR THE DECISION TO DEVELOP  
THE GLCM;  
--PROVIDE (AS IN THE PAST) A WASHINGTON EXPERT  
FOR THE PERMREP MEETING.  
SUCH DISCUSSION SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, UNDERCUT  
MINISTERIAL PREROGATIVES, AND WE BELIEVE COMPREHENSIVE  
COVERAGE OF CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER NUCLEAR BALANCE ISSUES  
SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR THE CUSTOMARY NPG MINISTERIAL.

9. AS WE ENGAGE IN SALT AND NPG DISCUSSIONS, WE EXPECT  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS CONTROL AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE  
ISSUES TO BE INCREASINGLY CLOSE, AND THAT CRUISE MISSILES  
WILL OFTEN BE THE SUBJECT AROUND WHICH THIS EXCHANGE WILL  
OCCUR. MUCH OF THE PUBLIC LITERATURE AND PRIVATE SPECU-

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LATION DOUBTLESS HAS STIMULATED EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS  
FOR CRUISE MISSILES. WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, GIVE PARTICULAR  
ATTENTION TO THE COORDINATION OF OUR APPROACHES IN NATO  
FORA WHERE CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE ADDRESSED, AND ASSURE  
THAT THE CONTENT OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS MEETS THE ALLIES'  
SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS. BY CAREFUL MANAGEMENT WE CAN  
PREVENT THIS AREA FROM BECOMING A GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF

NATO CONSULTATIONS ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

STRAUSZ-HUPE

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